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BUCKLEW V. PRECYTHE’S RETURN TO THE
ORIGINAL MEANING OF “UNUSUAL”:
PROHIBITING EXTENSIVE DELAYS ON DEATH
ROW
JACOB LEON*
ABSTRACT
The Supreme Court, in Bucklew v. Precythe, provided an originalist interpretation
of the term “unusual” in the Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution.
This originalist interpretation asserted that the word “unusual” proscribes punishments
that have “long fallen out of use.” To support its interpretation, the Supreme Court
cited John Stinneford’s well-known law review article, The Original Meaning of
“Unusual”: The Eighth Amendment as a Bar to Cruel Innovation. This Article, as
Bucklew did, accepts Stinneford’s interpretation of the word “unusual” as correct.
Under Stinneford’s interpretation, the term “unusual” is a legal term of art derived
from eighteenth-century common law that means “contrary to long usage.” Simply
put, Stinneford defines “unusual” to proscribe punishments that are “new” against the
backdrop of eighteenth-century common law.
Under Stinneford’s interpretation of “unusual,” decade-long delays on death row
are “contrary to long usage” and consequently “unusual” under the Eighth
Amendment. This Article proves that decade-long delays on death row are “contrary
to long usage” in two steps. First, it demonstrates that our Constitution’s framers
adopted the principle of immediate punishment articulated by Cesare Beccaria in the
Enlightenment Era. Second, with data gathered from approximately 150 execution
delays in eight states during 1770-1791, this Article shows that no sentence-toexecution delay exceeding three months enjoyed “long usage” in the eighteenth
century-common law.

* Judicial Law Clerk to the Honorable Nannette J. Brown of the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Louisiana; J.D., Order of the Coif, Georgetown University Law
Center; B.A., University of Louisiana-Lafayette (2015). The author would like to thank John
Bessler for his help and guidance in developing this Article.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Two principles have been established in the U.S. Supreme Court’s Eighth
Amendment jurisprudence for approximately sixty years. First, to decide whether a
punishment is “cruel and unusual,” the Court analyzes whether the punishment
corresponds with a maturing society’s “evolving standards of decency.”1 Second, the
Court’s application of the “evolving standards of decency” test has remained
inconsistent for sixty years.2 Surprisingly, the Supreme Court appeared to erase both
principles in its 2019 capital punishment opinion, Bucklew v. Precythe,3 by not once
mentioning the evolving-standards test when deciding whether a lethal injection
protocol was “cruel and unusual” under the Eighth Amendment. Instead, in Bucklew,
the Court determined whether a lethal injection protocol violated a person’s Eighth
Amendment right by interpreting the phrase “cruel and unusual” with originalist
methods.
Bucklew bifurcated “cruel and unusual” into two distinct requirements and
interpreted each term by turning back the clock to the eighteenth century. 4 The Court
defined the term “cruel” by consulting Samuel Johnson’s A Dictionary of the English
Language—the fourth edition published in 1773.5 That dictionary was the “standard
authority” for common folks in 1787–1791,6 the period in which the Eighth
Amendment’s “cruel and unusual” language was proposed, debated, and ratified.
Johnson’s dictionary defined “cruel” as “[p]leased with hurting others; inhuman; hardhearted; void of pity; wanting compassion; savage; barbarous; unrelenting.”7
Next, and more interestingly, Bucklew interpreted the word “unusual” to proscribe
punishments that “had long fallen out of use.”8 As support, the Court cited John
Stinneford’s well-known law review article, The Original Meaning of “Unusual”: The
1

Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958).

2

Indeed, the evolving-standards test has produced jurisprudence akin to a “train wreck.”
Benjamin Wittes, What Is “Cruel and Unusual”?, HOOVER INSTIT. (Dec. 1, 2005),
https://www.hoover.org/research/what-cruel-and-unusual. See also Youngjae Lee, The
Constitutional Right Against Excessive Punishment, 91 VA. L. REV. 677, 684 (2005) (describing
the Court’s Eighth Amendment jurisprudence as “ineffectual and incoherent”); Tom Stacy,
Cleaning Up the Eighth Amendment Mess, 14 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 475, 475 (2005)
(describing the Court’s Eighth Amendment jurisprudence as a “mess”); Jeffrey Omar Usman,
State Legislatures and Solving the Eighth Amendment Ratchet Puzzle, 20 U. PA. J. CONST. L.
677, 679 (2018) (describing the Court’s Eighth Amendment jurisprudence as a “one-way
ratchet” with “no workable solution” for state governments).
3

139 S. Ct. 1112 (2019).

4

Id. at 1122–26.

5

Id. at 1123.

6

MICHAEL J. PERRY, CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS, MORAL CONTROVERSY,
COURT 57 n.10 (2009).

AND

THE SUPREME

7

Bucklew, 139 S. Ct. at 1123 (quoting 1 SAMUEL JOHNSON, A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH
LANGUAGE (4th ed. 1773)).
8

Id.
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Eighth Amendment as a Bar to Cruel Innovation.9 In that article, Stinneford contends
that the term “unusual” is a legal term of art—derived from eighteenth-century
common law—which means “contrary to long usage” or, stated differently, “an
innovation.”10 Stinneford basically defines “cruel and unusual” to proscribe
punishments that are “cruel and new” against the backdrop of eighteenth-century
common law.11
Legal scholars have provided notable counterarguments to Stinneford’s
scholarship.12 Yet, as Bucklew did, this Article accepts Stinneford’s interpretation of
the word “unusual” as correct. If Stinneford’s interpretation of “unusual” is correct,
several contemporary punishments are “unusual” under the Eighth Amendment—
including mass incarceration, lethal injection, and supermax prisons—because those
punishment practices did not enjoy “long usage” in eighteenth-century common law.
This Article proves that decade-long delays on death row are likewise “contrary to
long usage.” First, this Article demonstrates that our Constitution’s framers, who were
substantially influenced by the Enlightenment, adopted the principle of immediate
punishment articulated by Cesare Beccaria, a revolutionary Enlightenment thinker.13
Second, this Article proves that no sentence-to-execution delay exceeding three
months14 enjoyed “long usage” in the eighteenth century-common law.15 Although
scholars routinely suggest that death sentences were quickly implemented in the
eighteenth century,16 no scholar has yet provided comprehensive data that displays
9

Id.

10

John F. Stinneford, The Original Meaning of “Unusual”: The Eighth Amendment as a Bar
to Cruel Innovation, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 1739, 1745, 1768–69 [hereinafter Stinneford, The
Original Meaning of “Unusual”].
11

Bucklew and Stinneford’s approach is far astray from the Supreme Court’s normal analysis
of the term “unusual.” The Court often declines to individually interpret the term “unusual” in
Eighth Amendment decisions. Instead, it often combines the two distinct requirements of “cruel
and unusual” into one test—whether a punishment violates society’s “evolving standards of
decency.” Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958).
12

See, e.g., John D. Bessler, Revisiting Beccaria’s Vision: The Enlightenment, America’s
Death Penalty, and the Abolition Movement, 4 NW. J. L. & SOC. POL’Y 195, 268 (2009)
[hereinafter Bessler, Revisiting Beccaria’s Vision] (arguing that that the term “unusual” “has
always had—and continues to have—a straightforward dictionary definition” and, in common
parlance, it “simply means not usual, not common or rare”). See also PERRY, supra note 6, at
57–58 (arguing that the ordinary man on the street likely would have understood “unusual” as
Samuel Johnson’s A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE defined the word—not as
Stinneford’s legal term of art).
13

See infra Part III.A.

14

This number excludes outliers. But if outliers are included, no sentence-to-execution delay
exceeding 9.4 months enjoyed “long usage.” See infra Part III.B.
15

See infra Part III.B.

16

See, e.g., Brent E. Newton, The Slow Wheels of Furman's Machinery of Death, 13 J. APP.
PRAC. & PROCESS 41, 55 (2012) (“[A] wealth of historical evidence demonstrate[s] that the
Framers of the Eighth Amendment considered significant delays between imposition of a death
sentence and its execution to be cruel and unusual punishment.”). See also Dwight Aarons, Can
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the average sentence-to-execution delay during that period. This Article, with data
gathered from approximately 150 execution delays in eight states during 1770–
1791,17 provides enough data to show that no sentence-to-execution delay exceeding
three months enjoyed “long usage” in the eighteenth century.
Simply put, because any delay exceeding three months did not enjoy “long usage”
in Anglo-American law, such delays are “unusual” under Stinneford and Bucklew’s
interpretation.18 If the Supreme Court is returning to the original public meaning of
the term “unusual,” it should make the return a principled one. 19 A principled return
requires the Supreme Court to hold that any sentence-to-execution delay exceeding
three months results in an “unusual” punishment.20

II. BACKGROUND
A. The Original Public Meaning of the Term “Unusual”
1. Stinneford’s Interpretation
Stinneford asserts that the term “unusual” proscribes any punishment that is
“contrary to long usage,” or, stated differently, “an innovation.”21 Simply put, an
“unusual” punishment is an innovative punishment that replaces traditional
Inordinate Delay Between a Death Sentence and Execution Constitute Cruel and Unusual
Punishment?, 29 SETON HALL L. REV. 147, 179 (1998) (“The time from the imposition of a
death sentence to the execution was not long” in Colonial America); Kathleen M. Flynn, The
"Agony of Suspense": How Protracted Death Row Confinement Gives Rise to an Eighth
Amendment Claim of Cruel and Unusual Punishment, 54 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 291, 299–300
(1997) (“[H]istory demonstrates that early American courts and legislatures did not permit
prolonged death row delay.”).
17

Those eight states are Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, Vermont,
Connecticut, New York, and New Jersey.
18

See infra Part III.B.

19

Whether the Court’s originalist methods will be principled—or selectively applied—is yet
to be determined. The forecast is not bright and sunny if you are wishing for principled
originalism instead of selective originalism. In Bucklew, Justice Gorsuch cited William
Blackstone’s Commentaries to demonstrate how methods that “had fallen out of use” were
“unusual.” See Bucklew v. Precythe, 139 S. Ct. 1112, 1123 (2019). But Justice Gorsuch cherrypicked information within Blackstone’s Commentaries. He failed to mention that Blackstone’s
Commentaries—the exact version he cited—in turn cited and adopted Beccaria’s immediatepunishment principle. See infra text accompanying notes 66–68. That principle forbids
excessive delays on death row.
20

This Article concentrates only on the term “unusual” in the Eighth Amendment. Whether
extensive sentence-to-execution delays are “cruel” under an original-public-meaning approach
is not within the scope of this Article. But Peter Baumann persuasively argued that
contemporary delays on death row are “cruel” as John Stinneford defines the term. See generally
Peter Baumann, “Waiting on Death”: Nathan Dunlap and the Cruel Effect of Uncertainty, 106
GEO. L.J. 871 (2018).
21

Stinneford, The Original Meaning of “Unusual”, supra note 10, at 1767 (citations omitted).
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punishments slowly developed over a very long period of time in eighteenth-century
common law—but not the typical “judge-made” common law that legal scholars
typically imagine. Instead, according to Stinneford, lawyers and judges in the
eighteenth century considered common law to be “customary law,” which is the “law
of long use and custom.”22 Long usage helped discern “rights and duties,” and it
helped justify state action, including the implementation of punishments. 23
Stinneford cites Sir Edward Coke—often considered “the most important common
law jurist in English history”24—to demonstrate how long usage in common law
provided the “most reliable basis for determining the goodness of a law because it
established both that the law was reasonable” and “enjoyed the consent of the
people.”25 Coke did not hide his fear and distaste of innovative punishments. He
argued that common law could “utterly crush” any “drosse and sophistications of
novelties and new inventions.”26

2. Innovative Punishments
Stinneford divides innovative punishments into three central categories. The first
category proscribes “punishment practices that were either entirely new or were
foreign to the common law system.”27 This category likely would proscribe most
twenty-first century punishments—such as lethal injections, supermax prisons, mass
incarceration, and gas chambers—and, most importantly, decade-long delays on death
row. By contrast, execution via firing squad would not be innovative because judges
commonly approved of that practice in eighteenth-century rulings.28
Stinneford’s second category precludes punishments that are “newly married to
crimes with which they had not traditionally been associated.”29 This category would
prohibit, for example, the government from transforming a driving-while-intoxicated
(DWI) offense into a capital crime because DWI offenses always have entailed less
serious punishments.30 Finally, the third category prohibits traditional punishments
22

Id. at 1768 (citations omitted).

23

Id. at 1770.

24

Id. at 1771.

25

Id. at 1774–75.

26

Id. at 1788 (quoting EDWARD COKE, INSTITUTES OF THE LAWES OF ENGLAND (1608),
reprinted in 2 THE SELECTED WRITINGS AND SPEECHES OF SIR EDWARD COKE § 33, 563, 563
(Steve Sheppard ed., 2003)) (citations omitted).
27

Id. at 1745. For instance, the framers feared that the federal government would replace the
common law system with crimes used in civil jurisdictions.
28

See John Stinneford, Original Meaning and the Death Penalty, 13 U. ST. THOMAS J.L. &
PUB. POL’Y 44, 59 (2018).
29

Stinneford, The Original Meaning of “Unusual”, supra note 10, at 1746.

30

Early History of Drunk Driving Laws, NEWS WHEEL
https://thenewswheel.com/early-history-of-drunk-driving-laws/.
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that fall entirely out of usage but are subsequently revived.31 Brutal punishments that
in fact enjoyed long usage in the eighteenth century—such as the “ducking stool”32—
would be outlawed under this category because, as Bucklew noted, such punishments
have fallen out of use.33

III. CAPITAL PUNISHMENT IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY
Stinneford’s three categories force courts to determine whether punishments
enjoyed “long usage” in the eighteenth century. To discover what type of delay
enjoyed “long usage” during that period, this part first shows that America’s framers
viewed immediate punishment as a necessity when implementing capital punishment.
The framers explicitly adopted Cesare Beccaria’s immediate-punishment principle
from the Enlightenment era.34 Second, this part supports that showing with research
on sentence-to-execution delays and crime-to-execution delays in the New England
states, as well as New York and New Jersey, from 1770 to 1791. 35 That sampling of
states shows the death penalty practices that prevailed in that era.

A. The Framers’ Views on Immediate Punishment
The Constitution’s framers were significantly influenced by an array of
Enlightenment thinkers.36 Their perspectives on criminal law, particularly capital
31

Stinneford, The Original Meaning of “Unusual”, supra note 10, at 1746.

32

A ducking stool was a “device for punishing scolds by repeatedly plunging them
underwater.” Id. (quoting BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 231 (8th ed. 2004)).
33

Stinneford uses James v. Commonwealth, 12 Serg. & Rawle 220 (Pa. 1825), to demonstrate
how a Pennsylvania court determined that the “ducking stool” had fallen out of use. See
Stinneford, The Original Meaning of “Unusual”, supra note 10, at 1813–1814. There are three
ways in which a punishment could “cease to be authorized by the common law.” Id. at 1814. A
punishment could “[1] fall completely out of usage for a long period of time; [2] it could be
used in England, but not America (and thus never attain “usual” status on this side of the
Atlantic); or [3] it could be disallowed by legislative reform.” Id. In James, the court noted that
no one in England endured the ducking stool since the middle of the seventeenth century. Id.
(citing James, 12 Serg. & Rawle at 227). Moreover, “it had never become part of the common
law usage of Pennsylvania.” Stinneford, The Original Meaning of “Unusual”, supra note 10,
at 1814. And, even if it had, the Pennsylvania legislature implicitly disallowed the ducking stool
when it prohibited the whipping post in 1790. Id.
34

See infra Part III.A.2.

35

See infra Part III.B.

36

See, e.g., Immanuel V. Chioco, Looking Beyond the Veil, 24 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD.
547, 553 (2017) (“Many of the Framers, such as Thomas Jefferson, Thomas Paine, and James
Madison, were deeply influenced by their contemporary figures in the European Enlightenment,
such as John Calvin, John Locke, and Montesquieu.”); John D. Bessler, The Italian
Enlightenment and the American Revolution: Cesare Beccaria’s Forgotten Influence on
American Law, 37 MITCHELL HAMLINE L.J. PUB. POL’Y & PRAC. 1, 32 (2016) (demonstrating
that “in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries” numerous framers were influenced
by Enlightenment thinker Cesare Beccaria); Samuel R. Olken, The Refracted Constitution:
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punishment, exponentially progressed from the mid-1750s to the latter part of the
eighteenth century.37 That progress occurred in large part because of Cesare
Beccaria’s succinct treatise: An Essay on Crimes and Punishments.38 His treatise
covered many subjects but, at its core, it analyzed the theory of criminal law with a
level of humanity never before realized.39 America’s framers were familiar with
England’s Bloody Code,40 which permitted the government to kill citizens for several
minor crimes.41 The framers considered that approach to be vicious in nature due to
the significant bloodshed it produced.42
By introducing humanity into the criminal law system, in light of the immoral
Bloody Code, Beccaria significantly influenced the framers’ views on setting and
implementing punishments. Indeed, the Constitution’s most prominent framers
studied Beccaria in some shape or form. Among those who read and studied Beccaria’s
writings include George Washington, John Adams, Thomas Jefferson, James
Madison, John Quincy Adams, Aaron Burr, John Witherspoon, Benjamin Franklin,
Dr. Benjamin Rush, William Bradford Jr., John Hancock, Justice James Wilson, and
Chief Justice John Jay.43 To understand the framers’ views on punishment, one must
first understand Beccaria and his punishment principles.

1. Cesare Beccaria and His Punishment Principles
Beccaria was born in Milan in 1738.44 To pursue his scholarly dreams, he left
Milan to attend a Jesuit college in Parma.45 He subsequently enrolled in the University
of Pavia from 1754 to 1758, where he studied law.46 Beccaria received his law degree

Classical Liberalism and the Lessons of History, 101 IOWA L. REV. ONLINE 97, 101 (2016)
(“[H]istorians agree that the Framers drew upon the ideas of John Locke, Thomas Hobbes, and
Montesquieu, and were influenced in no small measure by the Enlightenment.”).
37

See JOHN D. BESSLER, CRUEL AND UNUSUAL: THE AMERICAN DEATH PENALTY AND THE
FOUNDERS’ EIGHTH AMENDMENT 55–65 (2012) [hereinafter BESSLER, CRUEL AND UNUSUAL].
38

See, e.g., LOUIS P. MASUR, RITES OF EXECUTION: CAPITAL PUNISHMENT
TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN CULTURE, 1776–1865 52 (1989); id. at 55–56.
39

See BESSLER, CRUEL AND UNUSUAL, supra note 37, at 55–56.

40

Bessler, Revisiting Beccaria’s Vision, supra note 12, at 262.

AND THE

41

Id. at 268 (Blackstone recounted “approximately 160 different crimes punishable by
death”).
42

Erin E. Braatz, The Eighth Amendment’s Milieu: Penal Reform in the Late Eighteenth
Century, 106 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 405, 439–43 (2016).
43

JOHN D. BESSLER, THE BIRTH OF AMERICAN LAW: AN ITALIAN PHILOSOPHER AND THE
AMERICAN REVOLUTION 151–219 (2014) [hereinafter BESSLER, BIRTH OF AMERICAN LAW].
44
45
46

Id. at 28.
Id.
Id.
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and afterward returned to Milan in his twenties.47 As a young scholar, he studied
prominent works of political philosophy written by Montesquieu, Jean-Jacques
Rousseau, David Hume, and other Enlightenment thinkers. 48 Once he became wellread in Enlightenment texts, Beccaria joined a social group that regularly discussed
foundational philosophical topics.49 Those discussions and, particularly, his
admiration of Montesquieu’s books,50 gave birth to one of the most revolutionary
treatises ever written on criminal law: Beccaria’s An Essay on Crimes and
Punishments.51
Beccaria’s treatise, first published in 1764, inspired leaders all over the world to
reform penal systems with Beccaria’s new and progressive principles of
punishment.52 His most well-known principle called for proportional punishments
because they “make the most efficacious and lasting impression on the minds of men
with the least torment to the body of the condemned.”53 The framers wholly adopted
Beccaria’s proportionality principle in light of England’s vicious Bloody Code,54
which permitted the death penalty for more than 160 crimes.55
Yet, most importantly for purposes of this Article, the framers also adopted one of
Beccaria’s lesser-known principles—immediate punishment. Beccaria asserted that
immediate punishments are absolutely necessary.56 In his words, a punishment is
“more just and useful” when conducted “immediately after the commission of a crime”
because it “spares the criminal the cruel and superfluous torment of uncertainty.”57
This principle is especially important for capital punishment because the torment of
uncertainty—while one awaits execution—increases “in proportion to the strength of
47

Id.

48

See BESSLER, CRUEL AND UNUSUAL, supra note 37, at 34; MASUR, supra note 38, at 51.

49

MASUR, supra note 38, at 52.

50

Montesquieu Persian Letters and, especially, his The Spirit of Laws, greatly influenced
Beccaria. Id.; see also BESSLER, CRUEL AND UNUSUAL, supra note 37, at 37. Montesquieu
asserted that no government should violate a citizen’s liberty with extreme torture. MASUR,
supra note 38, at 51.
51

MASUR, supra note 38, at 51.

52

BESSLER, BIRTH OF AMERICAN LAW, supra note 43, at 3.

53

BESSLER, CRUEL AND UNUSUAL, supra note 37, at 37.

54

See BESSLER, BIRTH OF AMERICAN LAW, supra note 43, at 155, 163–64, 182, 189, 204, 217
(demonstrating that George Washington, Thomas Jefferson, John Quincy Adams, Justice James
Wilson, Aaron Burr, and Benjamin Franklin all favored proportional punishments); see also
Jack B. Weinstein, The Role of Judges in a Government of, by, and for the People: Notes for
the Fifty-Eighth Cardozo Lecture, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 1, 183–84 (2008).
55

Bessler, Revisiting Beccaria’s Vision, supra note 12, at 18 (2009) (Blackstone recounted
“approximately 160 different crimes punishable by death”).
56

CESARE BECCARIA, AN ESSAY ON CRIMES
ATTRIBUTED TO M. DE VOLTAIRE 75 (1778).
57

AND

PUNISHMENTS WITH

A

COMMENTARY

Id. at 73.
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[the defendant’s] imagination and the sense of his weakness.” 58 Beccaria suggested
that it is ruthless to force a prisoner to endure extended and “painful anxiety.”59
Beccaria further justified his immediate-punishment principle because it advanced
penological goals, such as deterrence of future crimes.60 The “degree of the
punishment, and the consequences of a crime” should produce “the greatest possible
effect on others, with the least possible pain to the delinquent.”61 To meet this end, an
“immediate punishment is more useful,” Beccaria argues, “because the smaller the
interval of time between the punishment and the crime, the stronger and more lasting
will be the association of the two ideas of Crime and Punishment.”62 Put another way,
if criminals know that illegal acts produce prompt consequences, they will be less
likely to commit crimes in the first place. In sum, Beccaria justified his immediatepunishment principle because it saved the prisoner from unnecessary torture while
simultaneously deterring future crimes.

2. America’s Framers and the Immediate-Punishment Principle
America’s framers explicitly adopted Beccaria’s immediate-punishment
principle.63 We begin with Thomas Jefferson, whose Bill for Proportioning Crimes
and Punishments in Cases Heretofore Capital in 1779 declared that “whenever
sentence of death shall have been pronounced against any person . . . execution shall
be done on the next day but one after sentence, unless it be Sunday, and then on the
Monday following.”64 As support, Jefferson’s Bill cited Chapter 19 of Beccaria’s
treatise, which argued that immediate punishments are necessary. 65
Similarly, the prominent William Blackstone, who the framers repeatedly cited
throughout the founding era, cited Chapter 19 of Beccaria’s treatise to support
immediate punishment.66 Blackstone emphasized that a judge “before whom any
person is found guilty of willful murder” must direct the prisoner “to be executed on
the next day but one” because a quick turnaround reduces the “short but awful interval
58

Id.

59

Id. at 74.

60

See id. at 76.

61

Id. at 74.

62

Id.

63

See, e.g., BESSLER, BIRTH OF AMERICAN LAW, supra note 43, at 164–65, 168, 170, 212, 216;
see also Braatz, supra note 42, at 439–43; Vikrant P. Reddy & Marc A. Levin, Right on Crime:
A Return to First Principles for American Conservatives, 18 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 231, 249
(2014); Ursula Bentele, Back to an International Perspective on the Death Penalty as a Cruel
Punishment: The Example of South Africa, 73 TUL. L. REV. 251, 303 (1998).
64

Thomas Jefferson, A Bill for Proportioning Crimes and Punishments, in MEMOIR,
CORRESPONDENCE, AND MISCELLANIES, FROM THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 125 (citing
Beccaria § 19; 25 G. 2 c. 37).
65
66

Id.
4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 397 (1769).
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between sentence and execution.”67 Blackstone noted “it is of great importance” that
capital punishment “follow[s] the crime as early as possible.” 68
Jefferson and Blackstone were not the only framers and legal commentators to
explicitly adopt Beccaria’s immediate-punishment principle. One of President George
Washington’s original Supreme Court nominees, Justice James Wilson, routinely cited
Beccaria’s immediate-punishment principle with approval. Justice James Wilson—a
crucial framer who often spoke at the Constitutional Convention—showed “plain
admiration” for Beccaria’s immediate-punishment principle.69 Justice Wilson adopted
Beccaria’s immediate-punishment principle for both inferior offenses and capital
punishment. He argued that “an inferiour offence should be inflicted with much
expedition” after the sentence because it will “strengthen the useful association
between [crime and punishment]; one appearing as the immediate and unavoidable
consequence of the other.”70
Moreover, in discussing capital punishment, Justice Wilson paraphrased
Beccaria’s treatise and argued that “speedy punishment should form a part of every
system of criminal jurisprudence.”71 Government must implement a punishment
“soon after the commission of the crime,” Justice Wilson argues, because it “should
never be forgotten, that imprisonment . . . in itself [is] a punishment—a punishment
galling to some of the finest feelings of the heart” and may be “as undeserved as it is
distressing.”72 The prisoner “undergoes the corroding torment of suspense—the
keenest agony, perhaps, which falls to the lot of suffering humanity.”73 Justice Wilson
followed Beccaria’s guidance in issuing a grand jury charge in 1791 when he stated
that capital punishments “should not be aggravated by any sufferings, except those
which are inseparably attached to a violent death.”74
Furthermore, another one of President George Washington’s original Supreme
Court nominees, Chief Justice John Jay, followed Beccaria’s guidance concerning
immediate punishment. Chief Justice Jay, in a letter to his wife, asserted that “[d]elays

67
68

Id. at 201–02.
Id.

69

BESSLER, BIRTH OF AMERICAN LAW, supra note 43, at 164–65; see also Michael J. Zydney
Mannheimer, Not the Crime but the Cover-Up: A Deterrence-Based Rationale for the
Premeditation-Deliberation Formula, 86 IND. L.J. 879, 913 (2011).
70

2 THE WORKS OF JAMES WILSON 629 (Robert Green McCloskey ed., 1967) [hereinafter
WILSON].
71

Id. at 630.

72

Id. at 629; see also Baumann, supra note 20.

73

WILSON, supra note 70, at 629.

74

BESSLER, BIRTH
omitted).
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in punishing crimes encourage commission of crime.”75 Thus, the “more certain and
speedy the punishment, the fewer will be the objects.”76
Finally, Beccaria’s wisdom shaped the beliefs of other founders who do not receive
extensive discussions in American history books. These founders include President
Washington’s second United States Attorney General, William Bradford Jr., who is
described as the “Enlightenment literati” of Philadelphia.77 Bradford—who
befriended James Madison while studying at the College of New Jersey in 177278—
served as a State Supreme Court Justice and State Attorney General in Pennsylvania
before being appointed by President Washington to serve as the nation’s top lawenforcement official.79
Bradford’s advice was requested in a letter from President George Washington’s
future Secretary of State, Timothy Pickering, regarding a potential procedural right
that would have enabled a “party accused before a court of oyer and terminer to
remove the proceedings into the Supreme Court.”80 In response, Bradford stated that
it “is the opinion of Beccaria, and all enlightened philosophers on the subject, that
punishment should follow the crime as quickly as possible.” 81 Bradford disagreed
with providing a party with that procedural right because it violated Beccaria’s
immediate-punishment principle. The procedural right postponed “the punishment till
the remembrance and destination of the crime is weakened or lost.” 82
In sum, several framers were deeply affected by Beccaria’s An Essay on Crimes
and Punishments. The framers employed Beccaria’s immediate-punishment principle
when drafting legislation and conducting judicial proceedings in the capitalpunishment context. This is crucial for understanding how long a prisoner may await
execution because, under Stinneford’s interpretation, a punishment must have enjoyed
“long usage” in Anglo-American law. As exhibited above, America’s framers and
early judges eschewed extensive delays between sentence and punishment.

B. Swift Implementation of Death Sentences from 1770 to 1791
America’s framers wanted capital defendants to immediately be executed after
sentencing. Yet, during the late eighteenth century, it was not “contrary to long usage”

75

Id. at 168 (citations omitted).

76

Id. (citations omitted).

77

Id. at 170 (quoting 2 OCTAVIUS PICKERING, LIFE OF TIMOTHY PICKERING 434 (Applewood
Books ed. 2009)).
78

Id.

79

Id.; Respublica v. Lacaze, 2 U.S. 118, 119 (1791) (listing William Bradford as
Pennsylvania’s Attorney General).
80
81
82

BESSLER, BIRTH OF AMERICAN LAW, supra note 43, at 171.
Id.
Id.

https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol68/iss3/7

12

2020]

BUCKLEW V. PRECYTHE’S RETURN

497

for prisoners to await execution for weeks or months after sentencing.83 To determine
the specific delays that enjoyed “long usage” in the eighteenth century, as Stinneford’s
interpretation demands, this section reviews how quickly death sentences were
implemented from 1770 to 1791.84
There were approximately 550 to 600 death sentences implemented from 1770 to
1791 in the United States.85 The data below is limited to the New England states—
Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, and Vermont—
plus New York and New Jersey. Those eight states accounted for about 290
executions.86 It was difficult to locate either the sentence date, crime date, or execution
date for more than 50% of the 290 executions. Thus, to provide different sample sets,
both (1) sentence-to-execution delays and (2) crime-to-execution delays are
provided.87

1. Sentence-to-Execution Delays from 1770 to 1791
This section analyzes sentence-to-execution delays in the New England states,
New Jersey, and New York from 1770 to 1791. Sources failed to provide a sentence
date or an execution date for the vast majority of capital defendants during this period.
The most common deficiency was the absence of a sentence date. As a result, the
sample size is limited to fifty prisoners who were executed from 1770 to 1791. The
results are demonstrated in Table 1 below.88
83

See infra Part III.B.

84

The analysis ends with 1791 because the meaning of “unusual” became locked once the
Eighth Amendment was ratified in that year. Put another way, the meaning of “unusual” cannot
change under an original-public-meaning theory post-1791 (barring a constitutional
amendment).
85

This number was gathered with Mike Epsy’s historic legal-execution registry. See
Executions in the U.S. 1608-2002: The Espy File, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR.,
https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/executions-us-1608-2002-espy-file (last visited Jan. 21, 2020).
86

See DANIEL ALLEN HEARN, LEGAL EXECUTIONS IN NEW ENGLAND: A COMPREHENSIVE
REFERENCE, 1623-1960, 151–80 (1999) [hereinafter HEARN, NEW ENGLAND]; DANIEL ALLEN
HEARN, LEGAL EXECUTIONS IN NEW JERSEY: A COMPREHENSIVE REGISTRY, 1691-1963 30–62
(2005) [hereinafter HEARN, NEW JERSEY]; DANIEL ALLEN HEARN, LEGAL EXECUTIONS IN NEW
YORK STATE: A COMPREHENSIVE REFERENCE, 1639-1963 17–27 (1997) [hereinafter HEARN,
NEW YORK].
87

The two groups contain a significant amount of overlap. The sentence-to-execution chart
below provides data on 50 capital defendants, and the crime-to-execution chart provides data
on 108 capital defendants. A vast majority of the 50 capital defendants—in the sentence chart—
are also represented in the crime chart.
88

The execution date for each prisoner derives from Daniel Hearn’s three comprehensive
registries. See supra note 86. Yet, because Hearn did not have the sentence date for a vast
majority of the capital defendants, I used multiple sources to collect the sentence date for each
capital defendant. Those sources may be found in Appendix A.
Furthermore, here are some important assumptions embedded in the sentence-to-execution
chart:
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Sentence-to-Execution Delay in New England, New York, and
New Jersey from 1770 to 1791 (Months) (Table 1)
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At the outset, the average sentence-to-execution delay was 1.14 months from 1770
to 1791.89 Yet there are different ways to review the data. If the two outliers—4.9 and
9.4 months—are excluded, the average sentence-to-execution delay decreases to 0.90
months.90 Alternatively, if the American Revolution years (1775 to 1783) are
excluded because a majority—but not all—of those executions were conducted very
quickly for war crimes,91 the average sentence-to-execution delay increases to 2.01

(1) In researching “sentence” dates, I also included “conviction” and “trial” dates. If more
than one date was available, the sentence date usurped the conviction date, and the conviction
date usurped the trial date. This should not cause a significant disparity because most eighteenthcentury defendants were tried and convicted on the same day they were sentenced.
(2) If multiple people were convicted or sentenced on the same day for a group crime, I
counted each member as one sentence-to-execution delay.
(3) I assumed each month contains 30 days.
89
90
91

See supra Table 1.
See id.
See, e.g., HEARN, NEW JERSEY, supra note 86, at 35–56.
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months.92 But the sample size dwindles to nineteen capital defendants without the
American Revolution years, which produces an unreliable result (for almost 600
executions). Either way, no non-arbitrary calculation produces an average sentenceto-execution delay exceeding 2.01 months.93
The question then becomes what type of delay enjoyed “long usage” from 1770 to
1791. Stinneford does not draw a bright line to distinguish innovative punishments
from punishments that were seldom employed over a long period of time—outliers—
but still utilized and agreed upon once or twice per decade in Anglo-American law.
Should outliers be discarded? The answer is probably “yes” when considering why
punishments must have enjoyed long usage in the first place. The common law
afforded the “most reliable basis for determining the goodness [and reasonableness]
of a law.” At its core, the common law demonstrated whether a law “enjoyed the
consent of the people.”94 An outlier punishment—abnormally occurring once or twice
per decade—likely did not occur often enough to test whether it in fact enjoyed “the
consent of the people” in the first place.95
Nevertheless, this Article takes the safe route and calculates the results both with
and without outliers. If outliers are included, any sentence-to-execution delay
exceeding 9.4 months—the most extensive delay—did not enjoy long usage in AngloAmerican law.96 By contrast, if outliers are discarded,97 any sentence-to-execution
delay exceeding three months did not enjoy long usage in Anglo-American law.98
Indeed, only 3.77% of prisoners awaited execution for more than three months from
1770 to 1791.99
This three-month conclusion is further supported by Chief Justice John Marshall.
While still practicing law in Virginia in 1793, Chief Justice Marshall filed a clemency
petition for a prisoner who awaited execution for five months after sentencing. 100 He
requested that the prisoner’s clemency petition be granted—and the sentence be
reduced—in part because the prisoner suffered during the extensive five-month
delay.101 In Chief Justice Marshall’s words, “the prisoner hath languished a long time
in jail, in a situation which must have added to the misories [sic] of imprisonment, &
92
93
94

See supra Table 1.
See id.
Stinneford, The Original Meaning of “Unusual”, supra note 10, at 1774–75.

95

That is true unless the punishment already had a long history of favoritism in AngloAmerican law. No evidence shows prisoner awaiting execution before 1770 for more than three
months.
96

See supra Table 1.

97

This calculation discards the two most extensive delays and the two shortest delays.

98

See supra Table 1.

99

Id.

100

Petition to the Governor & Council of Virginia (Sept. 2, 1973), in 2 THE PAPERS OF JOHN
MARSHALL 207 (Charles T. Cullen & Herbert A. Johnson eds., 1977).
101

Id. at 208.
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the horrors of an execution, which agony alone hath suspended.” Virginia’s
government, in response, granted the clemency petition.102

2. Crime-to-Execution Delays from 1770 to 1791
This section analyzes crime-to-execution delays in the New England states, New
York, and New Jersey from 1770 to 1791. The crime-to-execution data provides a
more significant sample size of 108 executions—more than a 100% increase—in
comparison to the sentence-to-execution sample size.103 Each capital defendant’s
crime date from 1770–1791 is more easily accessible than each capital defendant’s
sentence date. Although crime-to-execution delays do not provide a concrete
measurement of how many days each prisoner awaited execution after sentencing, it
does provide the absolute maximum number of days any prisoner could have awaited
execution. That is because no person is convicted and awaiting execution before the
crime itself transpires.
Now, with a larger sample size, the data may be divided into two periods: 1770–
1786 and 1787–1791. This permits the reader to focus on 1787–1791: the period in
which the Eighth Amendment—including the term “unusual”—was written,
proposed, debated, and ratified. The results are demonstrated in the chart below. 104

102

Id.

103

See supra Table 1; see also infra Table 2. The petitioner’s clemency petition being granted
likewise shows that the two outliers on the sentence-to-execution chart (9.4 months and 4.9
months) did not enjoy long usage and thus should not be considered.
104

This chart’s data derives from Daniel Hearn’s three comprehensive registries. See supra
note 86. The chart above handled Thomas Bird—the first federal death penalty case—
differently than other crime-to-execution delays. Bird, a crew member, killed his ship’s captain
while at sea in the summer of 1788. JERRY GENESIO, PORTLAND NECK: THE HANGING OF
THOMAS BIRD 25 (2010). The ship remained at sea for one year after the murder, and Bird did
not reach land (Maine) until the summer of 1789. Id. at 26. The chart used the ship’s landing
date—July 1789—because it is well-known that Bird was not tried or convicted until the ship
reached Maine. Id. at 42–49.
Here are other assumptions embedded in Table 2:
(1) If Hearn provided only the month in which the capital defendant committed the crime—
“June” or “July,” for example—then I assumed the first day of that month: “June 1” or “July
1.” Yet I did not include any defendant if his or her exact execution date was unavailable.
(2) If a defendant committed multiple crimes on different dates, I chose the latest date.
(3) If a group of people committed one crime—four men killed one woman, for example—I
counted that scenario as producing four distinct crimes. Thus, those four men would produce
four markers on Table 2.
(4) I assumed each month contains 30 days.
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Crime-to-Execution Delay in New England, New York, and New
Jersey from 1770 to 1791 (Months) (Table 2)
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Let us start with 1770 to 1786. The average crime-to-execution delay for that
period was 3.66 months. The shortest delay, 0.03 months, transpired in 1781 and the
lengthiest delay, 10.27 months, occurred in 1770.105 Unlike the sentence-to-execution
chart, the crime-to-execution chart does not produce any material outliers for 1770–
1786 because the delays are generally distributed from one month to ten months. 106
Thus, despite the average crime-to-execution delay being 3.66 months, it was not
“contrary to long usage” for capital defendants to endure a crime-to-execution delay
of ten months from 1770 to 1786.
Yet the most essential inference derives from 1787 to 1791 because that is when
the Eighth Amendment was proposed, debated, and ratified. The chart above provides
crime-to-execution data on twenty-six capital defendants from 1787 to 1791.107 A few
observations are in order. First, an average prisoner awaited execution for 4.23 months
after committing a capital crime.108 Second, the shortest crime-to-execution delay was
105
106
107
108

See supra Table 2.
See id.
See id.
See id.
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0.67 months and the most extensive delay was 12.83 months.109 Third, no outliers are
present in the crime-to-execution chart. Therefore, no crime-to-execution delay
exceeding 12.83 months enjoyed “long usage” in Anglo-American law.110 Those
findings do not provide a concrete average of how many months a prisoner in fact
awaited execution after sentencing.111 But the findings do provide the absolute
maximum each prisoner could have awaited execution: 12.83 months.
In sum, the initial sentence-to-execution chart analyzed fifty of the approximate
600 U.S. executions from 1770 to 1791. That chart sufficiently demonstrated that postsentence delays exceeding three months—or 9.4 months if outliers are included—
failed to enjoy “long usage” in the eighteenth century. Further, as a corollary point,
the crime-to-execution chart—with 108 prisoners—demonstrates that post-crime
delays exceeding 12.83 months did not enjoy “long usage” in the eighteenth century.
Whether one adopts the sentence-to-execution data (with or without outliers) or the
crime-to-execution data, decade-long delays are thousands of days astray from any
delay that enjoyed “long usage” in Anglo-American common law.

IV. MODERN DELAYS ON DEATH ROW ARE CONTRARY TO LONG USAGE
The sentence-to-execution delay did not balloon immediately after the States
ratified the Eighth Amendment in the eighteenth century. The Supreme Court, almost
one-hundred years later, recognized in In re Medley that extensive delays on death
row—four weeks in that case—may unconstitutionally increase a capital defendant’s
punishment.112 The Court worried about the inmate’s mental health because solitary
confinement “was an additional punishment of the most important and painful
character.” 113 In re Medley pointed to prior penitentiary systems that had solitary
confinement only and recalled that a “considerable number of the prisoners fell, after
even a short confinement, into a semi-fatuous condition, from which it was next to
impossible to arouse them, and others became violently insane . . . [or] committed
suicide.”114 Yet the Court’s concern in In re Medley—four weeks in solitary
confinement—started dwindling when death penalty litigation became a heated topic
in the 1970s.

109
110

See id.
See id.

111

The crime-to-execution chart also includes the time taken to catch, arrest, convict, and
sentence the defendant.
112

In re Medley, 134 U.S. 160, 172 (1890).

113

Id. at 171.

114

Id. at 168. Moreover, the state law at issue in Medley did not permit prison wardens to
inform death row inmates of their execution date and, therefore, many death row inmates
suffered from severe mental anxiety because they never knew which meal would be their last
meal. The Court held that such uncertainty increased each death row inmate’s punishment. Id.
at 172.
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A. Sentence-to-Execution Delay from 1930 to 2013
Sentence-to-execution delays started to significantly increase in part because of
the Supreme Court’s capital-punishment jurisprudence in the 1970s. Initially, from
1930 to 1970, the average sentence-to-execution delay was approximately 37
months.115 But in 1972, Furman v. Georgia held that capital punishment violated the
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.116 Four years later, Gregg v. Georgia reinstated
the death penalty in part because “meaningful appellate review” would be “available
to ensure that death sentences are not imposed capriciously or in a freakish
manner.”117 This meaningful-appeal requirement sparked a lengthier and more
complex appellate process. The average sentence-to-execution delay on death row
increased to seventy-four months in 1984—only eight years after Gregg v.
Georgia.118 The chart below tells the rest of the story for 1984 to 2013.

115

See U. S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS 1973 467 tbl.
6.145 (1973).
116

Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 239 (1972) (per curiam).

117

Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 195 (1976).

118

Table 3’s data derives from the Death Penalty Information Center. See Time on Death Row,
DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/death-row/death-row-time-on-deathrow (last visited Feb. 4, 2020).
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Average Sentence-to-Execution Delay (Months) (Table 3)
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The average sentence-to-execution delay was ten years in 1994, expanded to
almost twelve years in 1999, and increased to fourteen years in 2009.119 At its worst
moment, the average sentence-to-execution delay was 16.5 years in 2011, but recently
it decreased to 15.5 years in 2013.120 Those numbers are mere averages and,
consequently, do not highlight death row inmates who spend thirty to forty years in
solitary confinement while awaiting execution.121
A few Supreme Court Justices have already discussed extensive delays on death
row. That discussion mostly transpired from 1995 to 2000 when Justices John Paul
Stevens and Stephen Breyer dissented from the Court’s refusal to grant certiorari to
decide whether extensive delays on death row violate the Eighth Amendment. 122
119
120

Id.
Id.

121

See Examples of Prisoners with Extraordinarily Long Stays on Death Row, DEATH
PENALTY INFO. CTR., https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/death-row/death-row-time-on-deathrow/examples-of-prisoners-with-extraordinarily-long-stays-on-death-row (last visited Feb. 4,
2020).
122

See infra text accompanying notes 123–33. Justice Breyer once again noted his concerns
in 2015. See Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2756 (2015) (Breyer, J., dissenting). In that case,
Justice Breyer argued that “unconscionably long delays . . . undermine the death penalty’s
penological purpose.” Id. He also noted that “unless we abandon the procedural requirements
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1. Lackey and Its Progeny
The Supreme Court had an opportunity to deem decade-long delays “unusual”
under the Eighth Amendment in 1995 when Clarence Lackey’s certiorari petition
asserted that an execution—after seventeen years of delay—entailed “cruel and
unusual punishment.”123 Instead, the Court simply kicked the can down the road.
Justice Stevens, in a denial from dissent, argued that a seventeen-year delay “certainly
would have been rare in 1789, and thus the practice of the Framers would not justify
a denial of petitioner’s claim.”124 He also suggested, as Beccaria did, that decade-long
delays do not further penological goals, such as deterrence.125
Three years later, in Elledge v. Florida, Justice Breyer argued that the Supreme
Court should grant certiorari to decide the excessive-delay problem.126 He claimed
that “twenty-three years under sentence of death is unusual” when considering “the
practice in this country and England at the time our Constitution was written.” 127
Moreover, “an execution may well cease to serve the legitimate penological purposes
that otherwise provide a necessary constitutional justification for the death penalty”
once the prisoner awaits punishment for decades.128 As support, Justice Breyer cited
late eighteenth-century documents. Specifically, he cited Chief Justice John
Marshall’s clemency petition in 1793 for a capital defendant—which was granted—
because the prisoner awaited execution for five months.129 He also cited Thomas
Jefferson’s Bill in 1779 that required execution to be conducted only two days after
any death sentence.130
Justice Breyer, only one year after Elledge v. Florida, once again requested that
the Supreme Court grant certiorari in Knight v. Florida to decide whether decade-long
delays violate the Eighth Amendment.131 The defendant in Knight experienced a

that assure fairness and reliability, we are forced to confront the problem of increasingly lengthy
delays in capital cases.” Id. at 2764.
123

Lackey v. Texas, 514 U.S. 1045, 1045 (1995) (Stevens, J., respecting the denial of
certiorari).
124
125

Id.
Id.

126

Elledge v. Florida, 525 U.S. 944, 944 (1998) (Breyer, J., dissenting from denial of
certiorari).
127
128
129
130

Id.
Id. at 945.
Id.
Id.

131

See Knight v. Florida, 528 U.S. 990, 993 (1999) (Breyer, J., dissenting from denial of
certiorari).
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twenty-five-year delay on death row.132 Justice Breyer emphasized that it “is difficult
to deny the suffering inherent in a prolonged wait for execution.”133
Justice Breyer’s arguments in Elledge and Knight, in addition to Justice Stevens’s
argument in Lackey, are correct. Decade-long delays on death row are a new
innovation since the eighteenth century. Evidence proves that a sentence-to-execution
delay enjoyed “long usage” only if it did not exceed three months (excluding
outliers)134 or 9.4 months (including outliers).135 Yet contemporary death row
inmates experienced an average of 15.5 years on death row in 2013.136 That 15.5-year
average delay—in comparison to the average sentence-to-execution delay in the
eighteenth century—produces 6,100% more time awaiting execution on death row
(186 months instead of three months). If outliers are included, on the other hand,
current death row inmates are experiencing 1,878% more time awaiting execution on
death row than eighteenth-century prisoners (186 months instead of 9.4 months).
America’s framers did not tolerate a punishment system that forced prisoners to
suffer and agonize over death for fifteen or sixteen years in solitary confinement. The
common law system in the eighteenth century envisioned a swift capital punishment
process.137 That is why decade-long execution delays did not enjoy “long usage” in
Anglo-American law. Today’s capital offenders are not only getting sentenced to
death, but they are serving long terms of imprisonment in solitary confinement before
being put to death.138

2. Blame-the-Prisoner Argument
Justice Thomas, in Thompson v. McNeil, concurred in the Supreme Court’s denial
of certiorari and, moreover, responded to Justice Breyer’s extensive-delay
argument.139 It would make “a mockery of our system of justice,” Justice Thomas
argues, “for a convicted murderer, who, through his own interminable efforts of delay”
postpones his or her sentence with appeals and then claims that postponement to be
unconstitutional.140 Justice Thomas likely would respond to this Article’s position by
132
133

Id.
Id.

134

See supra Table 1. Ninety-six percent of prisoners from 1770 to 1791 did not experience a
sentence-to-execution delay that exceeded three months.
135

Id.

136

See supra Table 3.

137

See Part III.A.

138

See generally Michael Johnson, Fifteen Years and Death: Double Jeopardy, Multiple
Punishments, and Extended Stays on Death Row, 23 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 85 (2014).
139

Thompson v. McNeil, 556 U.S. 1114 (2009) (Thomas, J., concurring in denial of
certiorari).
140

Id. at 1117 (quoting Turner v. Jabe, 58 F.3d 924, 933 (4th Cir. 1995) (Luttig, J.,
concurring)).

https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol68/iss3/7

22

2020]

BUCKLEW V. PRECYTHE’S RETURN

507

arguing that sentence-to-execution-delay arguments are waived once the prisoner
expands his or her time on death row via appeals. Justice Thomas’s argument fails for
multiple reasons.
First, as Justice Breyer argued, Justice Thomas does not properly distinguish a
delay caused by “constitutionally defective death-penalty procedures” from a delay
that is the defendant’s fault.141 The complexity of the capital punishment system,
combined with a lack of resources, often pushes the appeals process from a few years
to a few decades. No appeals process should take thirty years to review a legal
decision. So, it is not surprising that other systemic delays, not caused by the
defendant, are the core problem. Some death row inmates wait eight to ten years just
to get a habeas counsel appointed.142 Further, Judge Arthur Alarcón recently
demonstrated twenty additional systemic delays in the capital punishment process.143
Not all of those delays are the defendant’s fault.
Second, a death row inmate’s case may involve appeals that are in fact against the
inmate’s wishes. Courts permit a “next friend” to litigate any inmate’s appeals if that
friend “appears in court on behalf” of a detained prisoner who is “unable to seek
relief.”144 This often transpires when the next friend—which may include a public
defender’s office—possesses evidence that the death row inmate is not competent to
waive his or her appeals. Michael Eggers’s attempted waiver is illustrative. 145 He
explicitly told his attorneys in December 2005 to “BUGG OFF! SCRAM! GET OUT
OF HERE! YOU’RE FIRED! YOU ARE NO LONGER NEEDED! HIT THE
BRICKS, THE HIGHWAY, THE ROAD! CATCH OUT! GO FLY A KITE ON THE
FREEWAY!”146 Instead, the federal public defender’s office argued that Eggers was
incompetent, and Eggers remained in solitary confinement for thirteen more years
while the appeals process churned on—despite his sincere effort to waive all
appeals.147 Eggers’s thirteen-year wait significantly exceeded any acceptable delay in
Anglo-American law from 1770 to 1791.
Finally, let us assume that Justice Thomas is correct: a mentally competent
defendant must waive all appeals before arguing that excessive delays are “unusual”
under the Eighth Amendment. Justice Thomas’s argument still fails because sentenceto-execution delays would exceed three months due to other systemic delays present
141

Knight v. Florida, 528 U.S. 990, 993 (1999) (Breyer, J., dissenting from denial of
certiorari).
142

CAL. COMM’N
FINAL REPORT].

ON THE

FAIR ADMIN.

OF JUSTICE,

FINAL REPORT 122 (2008) [hereinafter

143

Arthur L. Alarcón, Remedies for California’s Death Row Deadlock, 80 S. CAL. L. REV.
697, 707–08 (2007).
144

Chinyerum N. Okpara, Forced into Execution: Involuntarily Medicating Mentally Ill
Inmates to Achieve Competency for Execution, 43 T. MARSHALL L. REV. 1, 10 (2019) (citations
omitted).
145

Petition for Writ of Certiorari at ii, Eggers v. Alabama, 876 F.3d 1086 (4th Cir. 2017) (No.
16-10785).
146
147

Id.
See generally id.
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when a death row inmate “volunteers” for death. For instance, a death row inmate may
waive all appeals only after a court deems the defendant competent to “volunteer” for
death.148 Those competency hearings—in which psychiatrists and other professionals
evaluate the inmate—cannot be waived because of twenty-first-century due process
rights.149
The case of Michael Ross is illustrative.150 There, Ross fought to overturn his
capital sentence for almost twenty years.151 Yet, on September 11, 2004, Ross’s
lawyers informed the judge that he wanted to waive his appeal.152 In response, the
public defender’s office argued that Ross was not competent to waive his appeal.153
The state prosecutor countered with a motion to determine Ross’s competency.154 On
December 9, 2004, the court ordered Ross to complete a competency examination and,
in turn, a psychiatrist examined Ross.155
More litigation ensued—not at Ross’s request—which resulted in a competency
hearing being scheduled in April 2005.156 The public defender’s office eventually lost
and Ross was executed on May 14, 2005, more than six months after Ross first
attempted to waive his appeal.157 Ross’s six-month delay did not enjoy long usage in
the eighteenth-century common law because no sentence-to-execution delay
exceeding three months (excluding outliers) enjoyed “long usage” from 1770 to
1791.158
But if outliers are included, Ross’s six-month delay would have enjoyed long
usage in the eighteenth century. Nevertheless, other systemic delays—such as the
initial appointment of habeas counsel,159 moratoria by states due to drug

148

See generally Paula Shapiro, Are We Executing Mentally Incompetent Inmates Because
They Volunteer to Die?: A Look at Various States’ Implementation of Standards of Competency
to Waive Post-Conviction Review, 57 CATH. U. L. REV. 567, 568 (2008).
149

Id.

150

Stephen Blank, Killing Time: The Process of Waiving Appeal the Michael Ross Death
Penalty Cases, 14 J.L. & POL’Y 735, 746 (2006).
151

Id. at 777.

152

Id. at 736.

153

Id. at 741.

154
155

Id.
Id.

156

Id. at 746.

157

Id. at 777.

158

See supra Part III.B.

159

See FINAL REPORT, supra note 142, at 134.
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complications,160 courts taking more time to “get it right,”161 and automatic appeals
under state law162—could easily extend the delay enough to exceed 9.4 months. That
is exactly what happened to Steven Spears in Georgia, whose story is comprehensively
discussed below, when a Georgia law required an automatic appeal after any death
sentence. Spears requested death from the moment he was convicted at trial. 163 He
never helped his attorneys with any appeal but, due to both Georgia’s automaticappeal law and an alleged ex-wife litigating as a “next friend,” Spears suffered on
death row for almost ten years.164

B. The Tale of Two Different Eras: 1789 vs. 2016
Telling the stories of two capital defendants, who were executed 227 years apart,
will display how contemporary death row inmates are suffering abundantly more than
eighteenth-century capital defendants. This section will narrate the story of (1) Rachel
Wall, who was executed in Massachusetts in 1789, and (2) Steven Spears, who was
executed in Georgia in 2016. Wall and Spears endured dissimilar endings.
Wall, hanged one month after her sentence, spent her last moments thanking
everyone involved in the process, including the prosecutor and witnesses that may
have wrongly convicted her.165 Wall never hinted that she was being tortured while
160

See, e.g., Morales v. Cate, 623 F.3d 828, 831 (9th Cir. 2010) (upholding four-year
moratorium on death penalty due to lethal-injection complications).
161

Courts often reject excessive delay claims because “delay, in large part, is a function of the
desire of our courts, state and federal, to get it right, to explore exhaustively, or at least
sufficiently, any argument that might save someone's life.” Chambers v. Bowersox, 157 F.3d
560, 570 (8th Cir. 1998). This counter argument asserts that accuracy in capital punishment
cases is so important that prisoners must tolerate lengthier delays. But courts may not delay
other constitutional rights for 20 to 30 years—such as the Sixth Amendment right to a speedy
trial—to simply “get it right.” Trial delays are permitted for more “serious, complex” charges,
but that exception often applies to litigation with numerous criminal defendants. Barker v.
Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 529–31 (1972). Thus, courts must “get it right” within the time permitted
under the Sixth Amendment. So too here in the Eighth Amendment context. Once a death row
inmate has been psychologically and physically tortured for 3 months (excluding outliers), the
Eighth Amendment’s permissible clock runs out, despite the inmate’s invocation of habeas
corpus in part contributing to the delay.
162

See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 1239 (West 2004).

163

Rhonda Cook, Killer Still Refuses to Appeal Sentence as Execution Date Nears, AJC (Nov.
9, 2016), https://www.ajc.com/news/local/killer-still-refuses-appeal-sentence-execution-datenears/AYygN00tZoNd1O7IhBFcHN/ [hereinafter Cook, Killer Still Refuses to Appeal].
164

David Beasley, State of Georgia Executes Inmate for Strangulation Murder of ExGirlfriend, REUTERS (Nov. 16, 2016), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-georgiaexecution/state-of-georgia-executes-inmate-for-strangulation-murder-of-ex-girlfriendidUSKBN13B1DV.
165

RACHELL WALL, LIFE, LAST WORDS AND DYING CONFESSION, OF RACHEL WALL, WHO,
WITH WHOM WILLIAM SMITH AND WILLIAM DUNOGAN, WERE EXECUTED AT BOSTON, ON
THURSDAY OCTOBER 8, 1789, FOR HIGH-WAY ROBBERY (1789) [hereinafter RACHEL WALL
DYING CONFESSION].
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awaiting execution in prison.166 And she never begged for her life to end.167 Steven
Spears, on the other hand, begged for his lethal injection after spending almost ten
years in solitary confinement in Georgia.168 He analogized each day awaiting
execution to “a cancer eating [him] up every day.”169

1. Rachel Wall
Rachel Wall was born in Carlisle, Pennsylvania in 1760. 170 Wall, a devout
Christian who grew up on a farm, eventually abandoned the farm life and began
traveling in colonial America.171 On this trip, she met and married George Wall.172
The newlyweds traveled to Philadelphia, New York, and Boston. 173 The couple
struggled to financially survive and, upset with that unfortunate circumstance, George
deserted Rachel while the couple was in Boston.174 She remained in Boston without
any income or hope and was forced into prostitution to survive. 175
The prostitution proceeds did not fully support Wall, and she thus decided to
become a career thief. Wall was eventually convicted of grand larceny in Boston in
1785.176 That crime involved stealing goods from one of Boston’s most well-known
lawyers, Perez Morton.177 Wall then transformed her specialty from thievery to
piracy.178 She secretly tiptoed on docked ships in Boston at night. Wall pocketed
“upwards of thirty pounds, in gold, crowns, and small change” from a ship at Long-

166
167

See id.
See id.

168

Rhonda Cook, Georgia Executes Steven Spears for 2001 Murder, AJC (Nov. 16, 2016),
https://www.ajc.com/news/local/georgia-executes-steven-spears-for-2001murder/75Cr3QHMskGHT7POypFeNJ/ [hereinafter Cook, Steven Spears].
169
170
171
172
173
174
175
176

Id.
RACHEL WALL DYING CONFESSION, supra note 165.
Id.
Id.
Id.
HEARN, NEW ENGLAND, supra note 86, at 176.
See id.
Id.

177

ALAN ROGERS, MURDER AND THE DEATH PENALTY IN MASSACHUSETTS 50 (2008). The
Boston Court of Law sentenced Wall to 15 lashes and three years of indentured servitude.
HEARN, NEW ENGLAND, supra note 86, at 179.
178

RACHEL WALL DYING CONFESSION, supra note 165.
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Wharf in 1787.179 She also lifted a silver watch, silver buckles, and pocket-money
from another ship docked at Doane’s Wharf in 1788.180
Wall finally went too far. She attacked a female pedestrian, Margaret Bender,
along one of Boston’s most active streets.181 Wall clobbered Bender, placed a
handkerchief in her mouth, and lifted her bonnet and shoes.182 Pedestrians detained
Wall and, in turn, Boston charged her with highway robbery—a capital offense.183
Attorney General Robert T. Paine aggressively prosecuted Wall’s highway-robbery
case.184 Wall’s appointed attorneys, James Hugh and Christopher Gore, claimed that
no bonnet or shoes were found on Wall’s person upon detention and, therefore, the
pedestrians had detained the incorrect person.185 The jury did not take the bait.
The jury found Wall guilty of highway robbery despite Massachusetts never
having previously executed a woman for that crime.186 On September 8, 1789, Wall
received her sentence of death.187 Wall petitioned Massachusetts’s Governor, John
Hancock, for clemency, but Governor Hancock rejected her petition. 188 He reasoned
that it was time to show women in Massachusetts that they would be held liable for
crimes like male citizens were in 1789.189 On October 7, 1789, while providing her
dying confession, Wall confessed to several petty crimes but insisted that she did not
commit the highway-robbery offense.190
Most importantly, in her dying confession, Wall did not critique her prison
conditions or the people who participated in her trial.191 Instead, she stated, “I return
my sincere thanks to the [Honorable] gentlemen who were my Judges, for assigning
me counsel, and to them for their kindness in pleading my cause.” 192 Wall did not stop
there. “I likewise return my hearty thanks to the several Ministers of the town, who
have attended me since I have been under sentence” and “other kind friends, for the

179
180
181
182

Id.
Id.
ROGERS, supra note 177, at 51.
Id.

183

HEARN, NEW ENGLAND, supra note 86, at 176.

184

ROGERS, supra note 177, at 51.

185
186

Id.
Id.

187

BILL BOWERS, GREAT AMERICAN CRIME STORIES: LYONS PRESS CLASSICS 145–46 (2017).

188

HEARN, NEW ENGLAND, supra note 86, at 176.

189
190
191
192

Id.
RACHEL WALL DYING CONFESSION, supra note 165.
Id.
Id.
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care they have shewn to me, both for soul and body, which gratitude obliges me to
acknowledge.”193
Those words—conveyed only one day before her death on October 8, 1789—
displayed no outward signs of torture, disgust, or delay from imprisonment or any
other treatment while awaiting execution. Wall did not want her life to end but, on
October 8, 1789, she became the first woman to be executed in Massachusetts for
highway robbery.194

2. Steven Spears
Steven Spears’s journey to death row began once he started dating Sherri
Holland.195 Spears and Holland dated for roughly three years in Georgia, but the
couple eventually separated in 2001.196 Spears believed that Holland was cheating on
him and, in turn, promised that he would “choke her ass to death” if Holland ever was
romantic with another man.197 He kept that promise several months after he and
Holland terminated their relationship.198 Spears contemplated four distinct methods
to murder Holland: electrocution, strangulation, physical abuse, and with a firearm.199
He chose strangulation.200
On August 25, 2001, Spears secretly entered Holland’s home and remained in her
young son’s closet.201 After Holland arrived home, Spears loomed in the background
until Holland fell asleep in her bedroom.202 He subsequently entered the bedroom and
strangled Holland until her body went limp.203 Spears placed a garbage bag over
Holland’s head, secured it with duct tape, locked the bedroom door, and departed in
Holland’s vehicle.204 He eventually abandoned that vehicle and disappeared in the

193

Id.

194

ROGERS, supra note 177, at 51.

195

Spears v. State, 769 S.E.2d 337, 341 (Ga. 2015).

196

Brief of Appellee-Respondent at 8, Spears v. State, 769 S.E.2d 337 (Ga. 2015) (No.
S14P1344).
197
198
199
200
201
202
203
204

Id.
Id.
Id. at 9.
Id.
Spears v. State, 769 S.E.2d 337, 341 (Ga. 2015).
Id.
See id. at 600.
Id.

https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol68/iss3/7

28

2020]

BUCKLEW V. PRECYTHE’S RETURN

513

woods for days until located by a Georgia police officer.205 He voluntarily admitted
to murdering Holland once arrested by that officer.206
Spears was charged and convicted of numerous counts on March 21, 2007. 207 He
heatedly forbade his lawyers from presenting any mitigation evidence during the
sentencing phase of the trial.208 He even threatened to murder his lawyers if they
argued for a life sentence.209 Spears also refused to permit his lawyers to pursue any
post-conviction appeal.210 Yet his alleged ex-wife,211 Gwen Thompson, filed a
petition as his “next friend” to appeal Spears’s death sentence. In response, Spears told
the judge that his lawyers and Thompson were “trying to force their beliefs on me.”212
The judge eventually ordered a competency hearing and, when the selected
psychiatrist asked Spears if he wanted to be executed, he stated, “[n]ot really, but
would you want to live in a six by nine cell. That’s not living.”213
Spears conceded that he did not desire to pursue post-conviction relief because it
entailed “about another ten to fifteen years” in solitary confinement.214 He
emphasized that the “process takes so long” and explained that extensive delays are
“what’s wrong with the death penalty.”215 By awaiting execution in solitary
confinement for almost ten years, each day became “a cancer eating [him] up.” 216
Spears finally stopped suffering from that “cancer” on November 16, 2016, when he
was executed via lethal injection.217 Spears—unlike Rachel Wall who did not
complain about prison conditions and did not yearn for her execution date—was ready
for his lethal injection. Spears did not provide any last words.

205
206

Id.
Id. at 601.

207

The counts included malice murder, felony murder while in commission of aggravated
assault, felony murder while in commission of kidnapping, aggravated assault, kidnapping with
bodily injury, burglary with intent to commit theft, and burglary with intent to commit murder.
Id. at 598 n.1.
208
209
210

Cook, Killer Still Refuses to Appeal, supra note 163.
Id.
Id.

211

Spears denied that he and Thompson were ever married. Georgia Executes 8th Person This
Year, CBS NEWS (Nov. 16, 2016), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/steven-frederick-spearsgeorgia-executes-8th-person-this-year/.
212
213
214
215
216
217

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See Cook, Steven Spears, supra note 168.
Id.
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V. CONCLUSION
The Constitution’s framers understood that capital punishment would be
permissible in the United States. But the framers did not envision government
permitting a version of the death penalty in which prisoners endure fifteen years of
agonizing and tormenting delays. Instead, swift and immediate punishment reigned as
supreme and necessary. The framers imagined execution delays akin to what Rachel
Wall experienced: a month or so. That is why no sentence-to-execution delay
exceeding three months (excluding outliers) enjoyed “long usage” in the eighteenthcentury common law. Thus, contemporary delays—under Bucklew v. Precythe’s
apparent adoption of Stinneford’s interpretation—are “unusual” under the Eighth
Amendment because such delays did not enjoy long usage in the eighteenth-century
common law.
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APPENDIX: CAPITAL PUNISHMENT CASES IN NEW ENGLAND, NEW YORK, AND NEW
JERSEY
New England
Prisoner
Trial/Conviction/
Sentence Date

Execution
Date

Trial/Conviction/Sentence
Source
BENJAMIN LYNDE, JR., THE
DIARIES OF BENJAMIN LYNDE
AND OF BENJAMIN LYNDE, JR.
199 (photo. reprint) (1880).
SAMSON
OCCOM,
THE
COLLECTED WRITINGS OF
SAMSON OCCOM, MOHEGAN:
LEADERSHIP
AND
LITERATURE IN EIGHTEENTHCENTURY NATIVE AMERICA
195 (Joanna Brooks ed.,
2006).
BRISTOL, CONNECTICUT, IN
THE OLDEN TIME "NEW
CAMBRIDGE"
WHICH
INCLUDES FORESTVILLE 148–
49 (1907).
EDMUND R. THOMPSON,
SECRET NEW ENGLAND:
SPIES OF THE AMERICAN
REVOLUTION 157 (1991).
JOHN J. DUFFY ET AL., THE
VERMONT
ENCYCLOPEDIA
245 (2003).
2 PELEG W. CHANDLER,
AMERICAN CRIMINAL TRIALS
43 (1844).
2 PELEG W. CHANDLER,
AMERICAN CRIMINAL TRIALS
43 (1844).
2 PELEG W. CHANDLER,
AMERICAN CRIMINAL TRIALS
43 (1844).
2 PELEG W. CHANDLER,
AMERICAN CRIMINAL TRIALS
43 (1844).
PETER
C.
VERMILYEA,
WICKED LITCHFIELD COUNTY
57 (2016).
CYRUS EATON, HISTORY OF
THOMASTON,
ROCKLAND,
AND SOUTH THOMASTON,

William
Shaw

Convicted
10/03/1770

12/13/1770

Moses Paul

Convicted
12/20/1772

9/02/1772

Moses
Dunbar

Tried 01/23/1777

03/19/1777

Robert
Thompson

Convicted
04/21/1777

06/09/1777

David
Redding

Tried 06/06/1778

06/11/1778

James
Buchanan

Convicted
04/24/1778

07/02/1778

William
Brooks

Convicted
04/24/1778

07/02/1778

Ezra Ross

Convicted
04/24/1778

07/02/1778

Batsheba
Spooner

Convicted
04/24/1778

07/02/1778

Barnett
Davenport

Convicted
04/25/1780

05/08/1780

Jeremiah
Braun

Tried 08/23/1780
or 08/24/1780

08/24/1780
or
08/25/1780
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John Dixon

Tried 11/04/1784

11/11/1784

Thomas
Goss

Sentenced
08/11/1785

11/07/1785

Hanna
Occuish

Sentenced
10/06/1786

12/20/1786

Issac
Combs

Sentenced
07/04/1786

12/21/1786

William
Smith

Sentenced
09/08/1789

10/08/1789

William
Denoffee

Sentenced
09/08/1789

10/08/1789

Rachel
Wall

Sentenced
09/08/1789

10/08/1789

Thomas
Bird

Convicted
06/05/1790

06/25/1790

[68:485

MAINE: FROM THEIR FIRST
EXPLORATION, A. D. 1605;
WITH FAMILY GENEALOGIES
139–40 (2001).
BOSTON’S HISTORIES: ESSAYS
IN HONOR OF THOMAS H.
O’CONNOR 20 (James M.
O’Toole & David Quigley
eds., 2004).
Litchfield,
HARTFORD
COURANT, Aug. 29, 1786, at
2.
New London, HARTFORD
COURANT, Oct. 9, 1786, at 3.
MARTHA J. MCNAMARA,
FROM
TAVERN
TO
COURTHOUSE:
ARCHITECTURE AND RITUAL
IN AMERICAN LAW, 1658–
1860 55–56 (Gregory Conniff
et al. eds., 2004) (quoting
WILLIAM PYNCHON, DIARY
OF WILLIAM PYNCHON OF
SALEM 261 (Fitch Edward
Oliver ed., 1890)).
INDEPENDENT
CHRONICLE
(Boston), September 10,
1789.
INDEPENDENT
CHRONICLE
(Boston), September 10,
1789.
INDEPENDENT
CHRONICLE
(Boston), September 10,
1789.
JERRY GENESIO, PORTLAND
NECK: THE HANGING OF
THOMAS BIRD 48–49, 52
(2010).

New York
Prisoner
Trial/Conviction/
Sentence Date

Execution
Date

Trial/Conviction/Sentence
Source

Mary Daily

05/10/1771

DANIEL A. HEARN, LEGAL
EXECUTIONS IN NEW YORK
STATE: A COMPREHENSIVE
REFERENCE, 1639-1963 17
(1997).

Convicted
04/27/1771
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Gilbert
Belcher

Convicted 01/27/73

04/02/1773

2 NEW YORK STATE LIBRARY,
85TH ANNUAL REPORT 494
(1902).

John Lovey

Convicted 01/27/73

04/02/1773

2 NEW YORK STATE LIBRARY,
85TH ANNUAL REPORT 494
(1902).

Thomas
Hickey

Sentenced
06/28/1776

06/28/1776

Nathan
Hale

Sentenced
09/21/1776

09/22/1776

John
Williams

Tried 04/13/1777

05/09/1777

Jacob
Middagh

Convicted
05/03/1777

05/28/1777

HENRY P. JOHNSTON, THE
CAMPAIGN OF 1776 AROUND
NEW YORK AND BROOKLYN
D
A. HEARN, LEGAL
92ANIEL
n.2 (1878).
EXECUTIONS IN NEW YORK
STATE: A COMPREHENSIVE
REFERENCE, 1639-1963 19
A
LEXANDER
ROSE,
(1997).
WASHINGTON’S SPIES: THE
STORY OF AMERICA’S FIRST
SPY RING 51–52 (2006).
MARIUS SCHOONMAKER, THE
HISTORY OF KINGSTON, NEW
YORK 254 (1888).

Jacob
Roosa

Convicted
05/03/1777

05/28/1777

Edmund
Palmer

Sentenced
07/24/1777

08/08/1777

Daniel
Taylor

Tried 10/14/1777

10/18/1777

Claudius
Smith

Sentenced
01/11/1779

01/22/1779

Thomas
Delamar

Sentenced
01/11/1779

01/22/1779
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MARIUS SCHOONMAKER, THE
HISTORY OF KINGSTON, NEW
YORK 254 (1888).
ROBERT E. HUBBARD, MAJOR
GENERAL ISRAEL PUTNAM:
HERO OF THE AMERICAN
REVOLUTION 141–42 (2017).
ALEXANDER
ROSE,
WASHINGTON’S SPIES: THE
STORY OF AMERICA’S FIRST
SPY RING 58 (2006).
EDWARD M. RUTTENBER,
CATALOGUE
OF
MANUSCRIPTS AND RELICS IN
WASHINGTON'S
HEADQUARTERS, NEWBURGH, N.Y:
WITH HISTORICAL SKETCH,
AND DESCRIPTIVE SKETCHES
OF
REVOLUTIONARY
LOCALITIES IN VICINITY 34
(1890).
EDWARD M. RUTTENBER,
CATALOGUE
OF
MANUSCRIPTS AND RELICS IN
WASHINGTON'S
HEADQUARTERS, NEWBURGH, N.Y:
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James
Gordon

Sentenced
01/11/1779

01/22/1779

James
Fluelling

Sentenced
06/02/1779

06/08/1779

Daniel
Keith

Sentenced
06/02/1779

06/08/1779

James
McCormick

Sentenced
06/02/1779

06/08/1779

James
Smith

Sentenced
06/02/1779

06/08/1779
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WITH HISTORICAL SKETCH,
AND DESCRIPTIVE SKETCHES
OF
REVOLUTIONARY
LOCALITIES IN VICINITY 34
(1890).
EDWARD M. RUTTENBER,
CATALOGUE
OF
MANUSCRIPTS AND RELICS IN
WASHINGTON'S
HEADQUARTERS, NEWBURGH, N.Y:
WITH HISTORICAL SKETCH,
AND DESCRIPTIVE SKETCHES
OF
REVOLUTIONARY
LOCALITIES IN VICINITY 34
(1890).
EDWARD M. RUTTENBER,
CATALOGUE
OF
MANUSCRIPTS AND RELICS IN
WASHINGTON'S
HEADQUARTERS, NEWBURGH, N.Y:
WITH HISTORICAL SKETCH,
AND DESCRIPTIVE SKETCHES
OF
REVOLUTIONARY
LOCALITIES IN VICINITY 34
(1890).
EDWARD M. RUTTENBER,
CATALOGUE
OF
MANUSCRIPTS AND RELICS IN
WASHINGTON'S
HEADQUARTERS, NEWBURGH, N.Y:
WITH HISTORICAL SKETCH,
AND DESCRIPTIVE SKETCHES
OF
REVOLUTIONARY
LOCALITIES IN VICINITY 34
(1890).
EDWARD M. RUTTENBER,
CATALOGUE
OF
MANUSCRIPTS AND RELICS IN
WASHINGTON'S
HEADQUARTERS, NEWBURGH, N.Y:
WITH HISTORICAL SKETCH,
AND DESCRIPTIVE SKETCHES
OF
REVOLUTIONARY
LOCALITIES IN VICINITY 34
(1890).
EDWARD M. RUTTENBER,
CATALOGUE
OF
MANUSCRIPTS AND RELICS IN
WASHINGTON'S
HEAD-
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QUARTERS, NEWBURGH, N.Y:
WITH HISTORICAL SKETCH,
AND DESCRIPTIVE SKETCHES
OF
REVOLUTIONARY
LOCALITIES IN VICINITY 34

John Andre

Convicted
09/29/1780

10/02/1780

Wheeler

Sentenced
12/15/1781

12/22/1781

Wood

Sentenced
12/15/1781

12/22/1781

Christopher
Cooper
Petrus
Cooper

Convicted
04/26/1785

06/18/1785

Convicted
04/26/1785

06/18/1785

(1890).
SPENCER
C.
TUCKER,
AMERICAN REVOLUTION: THE
DEFINITIVE ENCYCLOPEDIA
AND DOCUMENT COLLECTION
29 (2018).
KENNETH
SCOTT,
GENEALOGICAL DATA FROM
COLONIAL
NEW
YORK
NEWSPAPERS:
A
CONSOLIDATION OF ARTICLES
FROM
THE
NEW YORK
GENEALOGICAL
AND
BIOGRAPHICAL RECORD 235
(2004).
KENNETH
SCOTT,
GENEALOGICAL DATA FROM
COLONIAL
NEW
YORK
NEWSPAPERS:
A
CONSOLIDATION OF ARTICLES
FROM
THE
NEW YORK
GENEALOGICAL
AND
BIOGRAPHICAL RECORD 235
(2004).
2 JOEL MUNSELL, THE
ANNALS OF ALBANY 293 (2d
ed. 1870).
2 JOEL MUNSELL, THE
ANNALS OF ALBANY 293 (2d
ed. 1870).

New Jersey
Prisoner
Trial/Conviction/Se
ntence Date

Execution
Date

Trial/Conviction/Sentence
Source

Cadry Lacy

Sentenced
04/13/1770

04/26/1770

Arrivals,
PENNSYLVANIA
GAZETTE, Apr. 19, 1770.

William
Reed

Sentenced
05/16/1772

05/30/1772

Philadelphia, PENNSYLVANIA
PACKET, June 1, 1772, at 3.
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Peter
Galwin

Sentenced
11/12/1774

12/05/1774

Rivington’s
New-York
Gazetter, November 24, 1774.

John Taylor

Sentenced
11/12/1774

12/05/1774

Rivington’s
New-York
Gazetter, November 24, 1774.

Thomas
Long

Tried 11/01/1779

11/04/1779

James
Hammel

Tried 02/18/1780

02/19/1780

Tobey

Tried 06/21/1780

06/24/1780

David
Gilmore

Tried 01/26/1781

01/27/1781

John Tuttle

Tried 01/26/1781

01/27/1781

DANIEL A. HEARN, LEGAL
EXECUTIONS IN NEW JERSEY:
A
COMPREHENSIVE
REGISTRY, 1691-1963 42
(2005).
ANTHONY M. SHERMAN,
HISTORIC
MORRISTOWN,
NEW JERSEY: THE STORY OF
ITS FIRST CENTURY 306
(1905).
DANIEL A. HEARN, LEGAL
EXECUTIONS IN NEW JERSEY:
A
COMPREHENSIVE
REGISTRY, 1691-1963 46
(2005).
DANIEL A. HEARN, LEGAL
EXECUTIONS IN NEW JERSEY:
A
COMPREHENSIVE
REGISTRY, 1691-1963 50–51
(2005).
DANIEL A. HEARN, LEGAL
EXECUTIONS IN NEW JERSEY:
A
COMPREHENSIVE
REGISTRY, 1691-1963 50–51
(2005).
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